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Introduction
Was the 1990-91 recession predominantly
"white collar," as many analysts and media
reports have claimed? And if so, did this public
focus on the layoffs of managers, professionals,
and scientists arise because the downturn hurt
white-collar workers more than their blue-collar
counterparts, or because their plight was some-
how worse than in previous recessions? This
paper examines these questions by analyzing
the absolute and relative severity of the recent
recession for both occupational groups, using
aggregate data from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS) for the six downturns since I960.
1
Our results show that during the 1990-91
slump, the labor market faced by blue-collar
workers was worse and deteriorated more than
the white-collar job market. However, the lack
of white-collar employment growth was un-
usual by historical standards. Furthermore, the
latest recession was harsher than most previous
• 1 For further comparisons between the 1990-91 recession and pre-
vious ones, we refer readers to McNees (1992). For a description of other
labor market conditions during the recent recession, see Meisenheimer,
Mellor, and Rydzewski (1992).
ones for white-collar workers, but milder than
the historical median for blue-collar workers.
The 15 months of recovery beginning in May
1991 also sent contradictory signals, but clearly
stacked up as the weakest rebound ever for
both occupational groups.
One difficulty in answering the questions
posed here is pinpointing the trough of the
1990-91 recession. For previous downturns, we
use the peak and trough months designated by
the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER). Because the trough of the recent reces-
sion has not yet been named, we follow the
lead of many analysts who, using the same gen-
eral criteria as the NBER, conclude that April
1991 will eventually be chosen.
2 In section V,
we compare the pace of the current recovery for
white- and blue-collar workers and consider how
our qualitative conclusions might change if May
• 2 The day before this article went to press, the NBER's Business
Cycle Dating Committee, which is the official arbiter of the economy's
peaks and troughs, designated March 1991 as the trough of the 1990-91
recession. Fortunately, our assumed trough is only one month later, and
experiments conducted with several alternative dates do not affect our
qualitative results. A set of slightly revised tables using March 1991 as
the trough is available from the authors upon request.1991 through July 1992 were included in the re-
cession. In general, experiments with alternative







Conceptually, white-collar workers hold salaried
or professional jobs and usually do not perform
manual labor. In contrast, blue-collar workers
hold hourly jobs that generally involve some
physical tasks. On average, white-collar posi-
tions require more formal education and train-
ing, while most blue-collar skills are acquired
relatively quickly, often on the job.
The reasons why economic downturns have
different impacts on these two groups hinge on
the various roles in the production process that
employees play. Historically, contractions have
had a muted effect on white-collar workers be-
cause their employment is less closely tied to
production levels. Typically, when a U.S. com-
pany faces falling demand, it cuts output and
lays off production (blue-collar) workers. By
contrast, white-collar workers are likely to be
retained in the short run. Their salaries are
generally considered part of the fixed costs of
operation, since their replacement costs (hiring,
training, and so on) are higher and their services
are not easily divisible. The employment of ac-
countants and engineers by the auto industry,
for example, is not as cyclically sensitive as that
of assembly-line workers.
Second, the compensation plans of white-
collar workers are often more flexible than those
of their blue-collar counterparts. Thus, the ad-
justment to an economic downturn may take
the form of lower profit shares or bonuses for a
firm's white-collar staff, while blue-collar work-
ers are more likely to lose their jobs.
Finally, the last 30 years have witnessed a
strong secular decline in the blue-collar share of
U.S. employment. Explanations for this phenom-
enon include technological changes that con-
serve on low-skill labor (such as automation)
and increased competition from less-developed
• 3 Throughout this paper, recession-linked changes in employ-
ment/unemployment are measured from the month of the previous peak
to the month of the trough. We do not investigate the possibility that
white- and blue-collar labor markets experienced different business cycle
lags. We also conducted analyses using three-month moving averages
(recommended by the BLS because of monthly variations in occupational
classifications) and found that our qualitative results were unaffected. For
ease of exposition, we present only the basic analysis here.
countries. Employment losses arising from such
structural shifts are most intense during a reces-
sion, either because they actually induce the
slowdown or because cyclical drops in demand
force marginally productive employers to mod-
ernize or to cease operations more quickly than
they would during an expansion. Thus, the over-
all trend away from blue-collar employment also
tends to deepen recessions for these workers.
On the other hand, three factors peculiar to the
1990-91 recession suggest an enhanced impact
on white-collar workers this time around, and per-
haps in future downturns. First, recessions do not
affect all industries equally. A slowdown will
exact a greater toll on white-collar workers if it is
centered in industries that employ a high percent-
age of these employees. Downturns in the bank-
ing, finance, or computer industries (all of which
led the way into the latest recession), for example,
will hit white-collar workers harder than down-
turns in the auto industry. Second, the recent
growth in contracting out for traditional white-
collar functions (such as accounting, advertis-
ing, and secretarial and design services) may
provide employers with a route for minimizing
the indivisibility of their white-collar staff. Con-
sequently, as their customers cut back, service
providers will lay off the white-collar workers
whose services they used to farm out.
Finally, the absolute impact of a recession on
any group of workers will rise with that group's
share of total employment and total labor costs.
The shift toward white-collar employment over
the past 30 years, when coupled with the rising
pay differential between white- and blue-collar
workers, suggests that employers may increas-
ingly resort to white-collar layoffs when they need
to cut costs. Conversely, during a recovery, we
would expect labor market conditions to improve
more rapidly for those groups that suffered high
rates of temporary layoffs during the recession, as
well as for those with a strong secular growth
trend. For white-collar workers, these two influ-
ences tend to work at cross-purposes.
II. Defining Collar
Color: The Data
The most comprehensive U.S. employment figures
are gathered in the BLS's monthly, household-
based Current Population Survey (CPS). At pres-
ent, the BLS organizes occupational statistics in-
to six broad categories: 1) managerial and pro-
fessional specialties, 2) technical, sales, and
administrative occupations, 3) service occupa-
tions, 4) precision production, craft, and repairFIGURE 1
U.S. Labor Market Indicators
by Major Occupational Group
Millions
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NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. Shaded areas indicate recessions. Ser-
vice occupation data are estimated from totals and subtotals provided by the
BLS and thus should be interpreted with caution.
SOURCES: Data for 1958-77 and 1983-87 are from the U.S. Department of
Labor (1983, 1988). Data for 1978-82 were obtained directly from the BLS.
Data for 1988-91 are from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and
Earnings, various issues.
workers, 5) operators, fabricators, and laborers,
and 6) farming, forestry, and fishing occupa-
tions. The first two categories are clearly white-
collar jobs, while the last three are distinctly
blue collar. Service occupations, on the other
hand, do not fit easily into either broad group.
4
Since the BLS does not provide seasonally ad-
justed data for services, we exclude this cate-
gory from our analysis.
5
These six occupational categories have been in
place only since the BLS changed its classification
system in January 1983. Fortunately, although the
change affected all levels of classifications, the
effect on the white-collar/blue-collar distinction is
minimal. The pre-1983 category "white-collar
occupations," now officially dropped, contains
(with few exceptions) the same detailed occupa-
tions now grouped into the first two categories
listed above.
7 The occupations in the pre-1983
"blue-collar" classification plus the "farm worker"
category correspond roughly to the last three post-
1983 categories.
8 The "service occupations" cate-
gory has remained essentially the same.
Further assurance that the occupational group-
ings are reasonably comparable over time can be
found by examining a time series of labor market
statistics. On the basis of answers recorded in the
CPS, the BLS divides the U.S. population into
three categories: the employed, the unemployed,
and persons out of the labor force. Those in the
latter category are not actively seeking employ-
ment, usually because they work without pay in
the home or are retired, disabled, in school, or
too young. Seasonally adjusted employment
and unemployment totals and employment
rates over the January 1958 to July 1992 period are
presented in figure 1 for these three broad occupa-
tional categories. No obvious discontinuities show
up in any of the series in January 1983.
• 4 Service occupations include workers in private households and in
the protective, health, food, and personal service industries. Like blue-collar
jobs, service jobs are usually paid hourly, may be somewhat physical in na-
ture, and require only moderate to low levels of general education. But like
white-collar personnel, service workers generally produce intangible, non-
storable products.
• 5 Seasonally adjusted data are not provided because the series is
too volatile.
• 6 For further discussion of the BLS changes, see the appendix.
• 7 The pre-1983 white-collar category includes professional and
technical workers, managers and administrators, sales workers, and cleri-
cal workers.
• 8 The pre-1983 blue-collar category includes craft and kindred work-
ers, operatives (except transport), transport operatives, and nonfarm laborers.
Our analysis adds farm workers to the pre-1983 data and includes (arming,
fishing, and forestry workers in the post-1983 data to improve comparability
over time.What is clear from the figure is that white-
collar and, to a lesser degree, service employ-
ment grew dramatically over this period, while
blue-collar employment remained essentially
flat. Furthermore, the cyclical sensitivities of all
three series differ by occupational groupings. In
particular, panel C suggests that white-collar un-
employment rates are both lower and less cycli-
cal than blue-collar rates. Because the 1990-91
recession saw a dramatic increase in the number
of unemployed for both groups, these charts
alone cannot reveal whether the downturn can
accurately be termed white collar.
There are no definitive criteria for judging a
recession's severity. Thus, we focus on a wide
range of employment and unemployment meas-
ures, comparing particular points in time (how
bad things are at the trough) as well as changes
over the cycle (how much they deteriorated
from the peak).
9 We examine both unemploy-
ment and employment, each of which can be
charted by the number of workers so classified
or be combined into the unemployment rate.
Focusing on the unemployment rate helps to
mitigate problems of interpretation posed by
offsetting movements in the individual series.
The appropriateness of any particular meas-
ure depends on the reason one is interested in
the white-collar/blue-collar distinction. For ex-
ample, in order to target job services appropri-
ately, the differential impact of the recession on
the pool of unemployed persons would be the
measure of choice. For those making or advising
others on career decisions, a measure of risk or
increase in risk of joblessness, such as the unem-
ployment rate and its change, would be more
useful. And for those interested in placements
or office space needs, the employment-related
indicators •would be of greatest relevance. Al-
though we try to summarize across all measures
whenever possible, it is clear that sometimes
our answers are not entirely uniform.
III. Absolute
Measures
To determine whether white-collar workers suf-
fered disproportionately during the 1990-91
recession, we examine a variety of labor market
indicators for the period. These figures reveal
• 9 Other nonemployment indicators that would be interesting to in-
vestigate are income, wealth, bankruptcy rates, or unemployment in-
surance changes over the course of the recession. Unfortunately, data for
many years are not available.
that blue-collar, not white-collar, workers bore
the brunt of the downturn.
1
0
Beginning with unemployment measures
(rows 1 to 6 of table 1), we note that in April 1991,
even though white-collar workers accounted for
over half of total employment, they constituted
less than two-fifths of the unemployed, below the
blue-collar share (row 1). *
] Less than half the in-
crease in joblessness over the course of the reces-
sion came from the white-collar ranks (row 2).
Furthermore, the white-collar unemployment rate
was less than half the blue-collar rate, with the latter
rising about twice as much from peak to trough
(row 5).
Only when we examine changes relative to the
base of unemployment at the beginning of the re-
cession (rows 3 and 6) does the increase in white-
collar unemployment appear comparable to, or
slightly worse than, that for blue-collar workers.
That is, these measures tell us that the pool of un-
employed became slightly more white collar over
the course of the downturn, although it was still
dominated by other occupations.
The employment measures presented in rows
7 through 9 of table 1 also offer little evidence
of a white-collar recession. Blue-collar employ-
ment shrank about 3 percent, while the number
of white-collar positions actually expanded, al-
beit slowly. In fact, since the white-collar and
service occupations added jobs, the decline in
blue-collar slots actually accounted for more
than the total number of jobs lost.
To evaluate the recession and its aftermath as
a whole, we repeated the analysis assuming a
trough of July 1992. The results are reported in
the last three columns of table 1. Although this
change does not alter the qualitative conclusions
discussed above, it does make the recession
appear somewhat worse for white-collar work-
ers when judged by unemployment measures.
For every unemployment labor market indicator,
extending the period of analysis raises the value
of the white-to-blue-collar ratio. For employ-
ment measures, on the other hand, considering
the whole period improves the picture for
white-collar personnel.
• 10 These results are qualitatively similar to those obtained using
preliminary data for February 1990 through February 1991, reported in
Ebertsand Groshen (1991).
• 11 The blue-and white-collar shares of employment and un-
employment do not sum to 100 percent because service occupations are
excluded.TABLE 1
Impact of the 1990-91 Recession on
White- versus Blue-Collar Workers
Labor Market Indicator





































































Share of employment at end of period
Share of increase in unemployment
Percent increase in unemployment
Unemployment rate at end of period
Change in unemployment rate
Percent increase in unemployment rate
Employment measures
Share of employment at end of period
Share of employment change
Percent change in employment
a. White collar.
b. Blue collar.
NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. Because seasonally adjusted data are not available for service occupations, they are omitted from the
table. In April 1991, total unemployment was 7,568,000 and total employment was 116,844,000. In July 1992, total unemployment was
8,843,000 and total employment was 117,759,000. Blue- and white-collar shares of unemployment and employment do not sum to 100 percent
because service occupations are omitted.



















































































NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. April 1991 is estimated trough of 1990-91 recession.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1983, 1988, Employment and Earnings, various issues).TABLE 3
White- and Blue-Collar
Employment during Recessions
Peak to Trough Change
in Employment Peak to Trough Percent








































NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. April 1991 is estimated trough of
1990-91 recession.




Since the 1990-91 recession was clearly not a
white-collar one judged by the absolute criteria ex-
amined above, we now refocus on whether white-
collar workers were hit harder than in the past.
First, we compare their unemployment experience
during the latest recession to recent patterns. Next,
we compare their employment experience during
past recessions to the latest pattern. Finally, we
compare the relative historical severity of the re-
cent recession for white-collar workers (using both
employment and unemployment measures) to
that for blue-collar workers.
Was white-collar unemployment higher or
did it increase more during the latest recession
than in the earlier downturns? The answer is no.
Table 2 presents separate white- and blue-collar
unemployment-based measures of severity for
the six most recent recessions. Column 1 shows
that the number of jobless white-collar workers
rose by greater absolute amounts in both the
1973-75 and 1981-82 downturns. In percentage
terms (column 3), which control for burgeoning
white-collar employment, the current white-
collar increase in joblessness is the second low-
est. Turning to unemployment rates, columns 5
and 7 show that the white-collar rate at the
1990-91 trough was lower than in two previous
recessions and that it increased less than in four
previous recessions. Thus, using the yardstick
of their own unemployment in previous slow-
downs, white-collar workers did not appear to
fare worse this time.
Was job creation particularly slow for white-
collar workers? Most definitely. Table 3 reports
changes in employment during the six most re-
cent recessions. Columns 1 and 3 reveal a strik-
ing difference between the 1990-91 episode
and the previous five. White-collar employment
growth during the latest downturn was by far
the slowest observed. And although the meager
addition of 167,000 white-collar jobs is still bet-
ter than the drop in blue-collar employment dur-
ing the mildest recession examined, in light of
the previously unabated growth of white-collar
jobs, this stall clearly sets the 1990-91 recession
apart. The disparity between the unemployment
and employment results must stem either from
a drop in white-collar labor force participation
or from a switch to blue-collar or service jobs.
In a historical sense, was the latest recession
relatively more severe for white-collar than for
blue-collar workers? Unlike the previous two
questions, this one requires looking at a wide
variety of indicators. Table 4 presents five pos-
sible ways of approaching the issue. The first
column, provided for comparison purposes,
shows the growth in white-collar workers' share
of total employment over the past 30 years. If
white-collar jobs were as cyclically sensitive as
blue-collar and service jobs, then column 2,
which reports the white-collar share of employ-
ment change, would be identical to column 1.
Instead, these numbers are uniformly negative,
indicating that white-collar employment con-
tinued to expand while total employment fell.
Column 3 of table 4 shows that although
white-collar workers remained a minority of the
unemployed in April 1991, they still constituted
a greater percentage than during all five pre-
vious recessions. What's more, column 4 indi-
cates that the current white-collar share of
additions to the unemployment line is also at a
record high. These numbers, while lower than
the white-collar share of jobs, represent substan-
tial and historically high percentages.
We saw in figure 1 that the highest jobless
rate reached by white-collar workers (more than
5 percent in 1982) barely approaches the lowest
rates experienced by blue-collar workers over
the last decade. Hence, column 5 of table 4
focuses on the gap between the two rates. The
white-collar unemployment rate for April 1991 is
almost half that of blue-collar workers. Historically,
it is the second highest white-to-blue-collar ratio,



































































a. Ratio of column five to column 6 in table 2.
b. Ratio of column 7 to column 8 in table 2.
NOTE: All data are seasonally adjusted. April 1991 is estimated trough of 1990-91 recession.























































































NOTE: 1 = most severe, 6 - least severe.
SOURCE: Derived from tables 2 and 3.TABLE 6
White- and Blue-Collar Employment
and Unemployment during the First































































































a. Defined as the change in the unemployment rate over the 15 months following the trough, divided by the rise in the unemployment rate
from the previous peak to the trough.
b. White collar.
c. Blue collar.
d. Because the recovery following the 1980 recession lasted only seven months, we present statistics for July 1980, the next peak.
NOTE: April 1991 is estimated trough of 1990-91 recession.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor (1983, 1988, Employment and Earnings, various issues).
What about relative increases in the propor-
tion of unemployed? Column 6 of table 4
reports the ratio of the percentage increase in
the white-collar unemployment rate to that for
blue-collar employees. In all five previous reces-
sions, white-collar jobless rates increased
proportionally less than blue-collar rates (that is,
the ratio was less than one). Only in the recent
downturn was the opposite true.
By the five measures considered in table 4, the
1990-91 recession appears to have been deeper,
in a historical sense, for white-collar than for blue-
collar workers. To reinforce this point, table 5
presents the results discussed earlier in a different
form. We rank each recession according to the
various criteria considered above, side by side for
both groups of workers. Among white-collar
employees, the harshest downturns occurred in
1973-75 and 1981-82, using the unemployment
criteria Q—IV). Using those (within-white-collar)
criteria, the 1990-91 recession ranks either third or
fifth in terms of severity. However, when changes
in employment (criteria V and VI) are considered,
the latest downturn was the deepest for white-collar
workers. For blue-collar workers, it does not rank
above fourth for any of the measures listed above.
For a relative perspective, we next compare
the rankings of white- and blue-collar workers
for each recession. For example, by criterion I,
the 1990-91 recession was relatively deeper for
white-collar workers (third compared to sixth in
severity). Using this approach and considering
all six criteria (particularly the employment-
based gauges), the latest downturn ranks consis-
tently more severe for white-collar workers. This,
then, is one sense in which the recent recession





Table 6 compares various measures of white-
and blue-collar workers' relative performance
between April 1991 and July 1992 with the first
15 months of recovery after the earlier reces-
sions. In the past, the lower cyclical sensitivity
of white-collar jobs has meant that recoveries
were felt most strongly in the blue-collar job
market. Historically, during the first 15 months
after a trough, both blue- and white-collar employ-
ment has risen, but blue-collar employment has
usually picked up at least as fast, and often much
faster, than the white-collar numbers, presumably
reflecting workers recalled from temporary layoffs.
Similarly, the ranks of the blue-collar unemployedhave shrunk faster than those of jobless white-
collar workers, which have sometimes con-
tinued to rise after the trough.
If we use the unemployment rate at the pre-
vious trough as a benchmark, we can measure the
extent to which labor markets recover in the first
15 months after a recession. Column 9 presents
such estimates for each of the earlier recessions.
For instance, by May 1962,15 months after the
February 1961 trough, the white-collar unemploy-
ment rate had already subsided to slightly below
its level at the previous peak. In contrast, 15
months after the next trough, it had fallen by only
7.4 percent of the amount it had climbed between
December 1969 and November 1970. Comparing
the white-collar and blue-collar extents of recov-
ery in columns 9 and 10, respectively, reinforces
the notion that the pace of recovery tends to be
faster in the blue-collar job market.
The bottom row lists figures for the current
recovery. Columns 1 and 2 show that employ-
ment of white-collar workers has increased,
while blue-collar jobs have continued to con-
tract. Nevertheless, column 3 indicates that
white-collar unemployment has risen rather than
fallen — which also happened after two earlier
downturns, though not nearly as dramatically.
This suggests that entrants into the white-collar
labor market are far outstripping increases in
available positions, raising joblessness much
more rapidly in the white-collar ranks. The 9.0
percent uptick in blue-collar unemployment
since April 1991 is uncharacteristic of recent re-
coveries. Unemployment rates have risen for
both white- and blue-collar occupations, with
the white-collar rate adding another two-thirds
of what it gained before April 1991, and the
blue-collar rate adding almost half again what it
had gained before.
Although this analysis of recoveries suggests
that the current one is particularly weak, it does
not contradict our previous conclusions. Labor
market conditions for blue-collar workers con-
tinue to be worse than for their white-collar
counterparts. Judged by employment measures,
this recovery is slow for white-collar workers,
but not unusually so, while blue-collar workers'
losses are unprecedented. Furthermore, unem-
ployment indicators for May 1991 through July
1992 hardly point to a recovery for either type
of worker. Although it is not unusual for white-
collar joblessness to pick up during recoveries,
the current rise is uncharacteristically large. And
since I960, no other recovery has seen a net
increase in blue-collar unemployment over the
15 months following the trough.
VI. Conclusion
This paper investigates whether the recession that
began in July 1990 can accurately be characterized
as white collar. We examine the employment/
unemployment status of white- and blue-collar
workers during the latest downturn and in the five
post-1960 recessions in order to address the ques-
tion from various angles. The answer we offer
depends crucially on how the question is posed.
The absolute, narrowly focused question of
whether white-collar workers bore the brunt of
the recent recession yields a strong no: Blue-collar
workers suffered larger unemployment increases
and job losses and experienced higher unemploy-
ment rates. And when we ask whether the level
of, or the increase in, white-collar unemployment
reached a historical high, the answer is also an un-
equivocal no. By every measure considered here,
the 1990-91 recession was less severe in this
respect than at least two previous downturns.
But when we ask whether the growth of
white-collar employment fell to a record low for
a recession, the answer is a definite yes. White-
collar job growth essentially stopped during the
latest downturn, as opposed to just slowing, as
it did in the previous five episodes.
Furthermore, when we ask whether, com-
pared to their own experience in the earlier reces-
sions, this one had a more severe impact on white-
collar workers than on their blue-collar counter-
parts, the answer is also yes. In particular, when
measured relative to their own history of employ-
ment changes during recessions, white-collar
workers were clearly hit disproportionately hard.
By all employment/unemployment criteria exam-
ined here, the latest downturn for white-collar
workers ranks worse, in a historical sense, than
the downturn for blue-collar workers.
Last, when we ask whether white-collar work-
ers are lagging their blue-collar counterparts dur-
ing the current recovery, the answer is less clear.
The 15 months beginning in May 1991 rank as the
weakest historically for both occupational groups,
particularly for blue-collar workers.
Any explanation for the pattern of occupa-
tional impact seen in the 1990-91 downturn
will ultimately require further analysis of secular
changes in the structure of employment. Per-
haps the changes in the white-collar labor mar-
ket that we attribute to the recession in fact
reflect a long-run shift in the previously uninter-
rupted growth of white-collar jobs, as suggestedin Cappelli (1992).
1
2 If so, the 1990-91 employ-
ment decline and tepid recovery may actually
be the result of increased permanent, rather




Also of interest is why the recent recession
slowed white-collar employment relatively more
than it raised unemployment. Since losing one's
job is usually a ticket to the unemployment line,
the dissimilar results for these two measures
present a puzzle. What did the displaced white-
collar workers do during the recession instead
of joining the ranks of the unemployed?
1
4 And
do their activities explain the sharp rise in white-
collar unemployment during the recovery?
Until CPS data files with individual responses
are released for analysis, we cannot answer
these questions, but we can list some intriguing
possibilities. White-collar workers may have
delayed or avoided entry (or reentry) into the
labor market by pursuing more education or
training, by accepting early retirement offers, or
by performing nonmarket activities in the
home. Alternatively, they may have worked,
perhaps temporarily, at blue-collar or service
jobs. The answer should provide insights into
the labor market of the 1990s, since these pos-
sibilities have different implications for both the
composition and quality of the work force.
Finally, our conclusion that the 1990-91 down-
turn was more white collar than usual should not
obscure the overriding fact that, judged by
employment/unemployment criteria, recessions
still exact a greater toll on blue-collar workers. By
all measures examined here, the harshest reces-
sions experienced by white-collar workers barely
measure up to the mildest suffered by their blue-
collar counterparts. In any absolute sense, the
1990-91 slump was clearly a blue-collar recession,
like all those at least as far back as I960.
Appendix
In January 1983, the BLS changed its occupation
classification system from the Dictionary of Oc-
cupational Titles to the Standard Occupational
Classifications (see Green et al. [1983]). Fortu-
nately, although the shift affected all levels of
classifications, we believe that the effect on the
white-collar/blue-collar distinction is minimal.
The few instances in which the reclassifica-
tion moved workers across broad occupational
categories are listed in table A—1. Were such
movements substantial, they could compromise
the comparability of the data over time. Using
1982 employment figures, about 200,000
workers were moved from white collar to blue
collar, 123,000 from blue collar to white collar,
409,000 from services to white collar, 7,000
from white collar to services, and 8,000 from
blue collar to services.
The total number of individuals reclassified
constitutes less than 1 percent of U.S. employ-
ment, and the largest individual change,
moving practical nurses from services to white
collar, affects less than half of 1 percent of total
employment in 1982. Thus, we feel reasonably
confident that the reclassification is unlikely to
have affected our qualitative results.
• 12 Also consistent with this hypothesis is evidence of a shift in the
industrial distribution of displaced workers during the 1980s away from
manufacturing and toward the service and retail trade industries (see
Podgursky[1992]).
• 13 In fact, this recovery has been characterized by a dramatic in-
crease in the percentage of job losers across all industries who expect
their layoffs to be permanent (see Altig and Bryan [1992] and U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor [1992]). In general, layoffs from nonmanufacturing jobs
are much more likely to be permanent.
• 14 Of course, these numbers are not strictly contradictory. The
number of unemployed white-collar workers has increased by 628,000,
while white-collar jobs have grown little. However, as our analysis indi-
cates, it is this recession's employment growth that was particularly slow.
Thus, it may be more appropriate to think of the total number of white-collar
jobs lost as the number that would have been created had the secular trend
toward increased white-collar employment continued unabated. The unusual
spurt in white-collar unemployment during the early months of the recovery
may also be part of the story.TABLE A-1
Effect of 1983 Change in the BLS
Occupational Classification System
Occupation
Ship officers, pilots, and pursers
Inspectors (not elsewhere classified)
Railroad conductors















































a. Total employment in 1982: 101,206,000.
b. White collar.
c. Blue collar.
SOURCE: Unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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